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The commentary gives a clear and instructive summary of our main arguments
against both, intellectualist and anti-intellectualist accounts of knowing-how. But
the aim of our account is not correctly described as an attempt to give an explan-
ation of certain cognitive capacities that are taken to be expressions of know-
ledge-how in terms of underlying mental representations. (Glauer this collection,
p.10). What we aim at is not an empirical theory of knowing-how, but a framework
that would be useful for cognitive scientific research on phenomena of knowing-
how. 
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1 Answer to the Commentary
First, we want to thank Ramiro Glauer and em-
phasize that his commentary gives a clear and
instructive  summary  of  our  main  arguments
against both intellectualist and anti-intellectual-
ist accounts of knowing-how (see Section 2). As
he rightly points out, we are parting ways with
Jason Stanley (2011) with respect to the issue
of  propositionality as  an  alleged  demarcation
criterion  between  knowing-how  and  knowing-
that. There are at least three different concep-
tions of propositionality, and none turns out to
be helpful in making the distinction. In particu-
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lar, the semantic reading of propositionality, ac-
cording to Stanley’s thoughtful and impressive
account, applies to clear-cut cases of knowing-
how. Since knowing-how is no less propositional,
according to the semantic reading, than know-
ing-that, there is no hope of understanding the
peculiarities of knowing-how by adopting such a
stance.
In Section 3, Glauer then turns to what in
his opinion is the main difference between Stan-
ley’s and our account. Unfortunately, we don’t
think that he quite grasps the point that is im-
portant to us when he argues that “what hap-
pens between Stanley and Bartels & May’s dis-
cussion of kinds of knowledge, then, is a shift
from a personal-level perspective to a level at
which  the  cognitive  system  is  described”
(Glauer this collection, p. 4), and later, “Bartels
& May, on the other hand, want to explain the
peculiarities of practical and theoretical know-
ledge in terms of the involved underlying repres-
entations” (Glauer this collection, p. 5). This,
we have to say, is clearly a misrepresentation of
our account and the intentions behind our de-
veloping it. 
To be more specific, we argue that neither
the semantic nor the representational reading of
propositionality is suited to grounding the dis-
tinction  between  knowing-how  and  knowing-
that (Bartels &  May this collection, pp. 5–6):
“[w]hether  a  piece  of  knowledge  is  a  case  of
practical  or of  theoretical knowledge does not
depend on whether it is supported by language-
like structures or not” (p. 6). Thus, contrary to
the picture drawn in the commentary, we agree
with Stanley with respect to his denial of a rep-
resentational  demarcation  criterion  between
knowing-how  and  knowing-that.  We  thereby
don’t want to express any anti-representational
reservations (as is also the case, in our opinion,
for Stanley). However, we are skeptical with re-
spect to any type of account that, in rather in-
tuitive ways, identifies kinds of knowledge with
ways of representing knowledge. This indeed is
our main issue of disagreement with the anti-in-
tellectualists (Glauer mentions this on p. 3). 
What  about  the  “shift  from a  personal-
level perspective to a level at which the cognit-
ive system is described” that  Glauer  mentions
(this collection, p. 4)? First, we are not quite
sure how Glauer would himself mark the differ-
ence between a “person” and a “cognitive sys-
tem”, and what relevance he would ascribe to
that  difference  with  respect  to  the  issue  of
knowing-how. Our paper wants to make clear
that the first-person-perspective is an important
constituent in the analysis of the specific dispos-
itional states that characterize “practical ways
of thinking”—specific ways of epistemic access
to propositional contents when knowing-how is
at stake (Bartels &  May this collection, p. 6).
Thus, we agree that the knowing person, includ-
ing all of his or her cognitive capacities and be-
havioral resources, has to be taken into account
for a thorough analysis of knowing-how; see, for
instance, our example of the waiter in a restaur-
ant balancing different types of coffee cups (p.
16).
In  essence,  Ramiro  Glauer’s  commentary
draws a picture of our account that misses its
main intentions. The aim of our account is not
correctly described as “an attempt to give an
explanation of certain cognitive capacities that
are taken to be expressions of knowledge-how in
terms  of  underlying  mental  representations”
(Glauer this collection, p. 9). Instead, our aim is
to identify and specify some constituents of an
empirically fruitful theory of knowing-how. In a
first step, as we argue, this requires a careful
description  of  central  epistemic  peculiarities
that  characterize  knowing-how  as  opposed  to
knowing-that, and that thus have to be covered
by any adequate theory (see Bartels & May this
collection, pp. 12–13). We then ask what gen-
eral  sort  of  epistemic  capacities may coincide
with the peculiar capacities embodied by know-
ing-how and knowing-that, respectively. And fi-
nally, we suggest that conceptuality versus non-
conceptuality may  be  the  general  distinction
that  coincides  with  typical  knowing-that  and
knowing-how-capacities, and go on to highlight
some of the explanatory virtues of such a pro-
posal.  For the last  step we use a theory that
characterizes conceptual abilities by specific be-
havioral traits (Newen & Bartels 2007). 
Our approach to the problem leaves open
by what types of  mental representations those
conceptual abilities may be supported, if at all.
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It cannot even be guaranteed that the distinc-
tions  drawn within  our  conceptual  framework
coincide with any distinctions between repres-
entational formats. What we aim at is not an
empirical theory of knowing-how, but a  frame-
work that would be useful for cognitive scientific
research  on  the  phenomena  of  knowing-how.
Thus, it may turn out to be useful to fill that
framework  with  psychological  or  neurological
hypotheses concerning representational mechan-
isms that may produce the epistemic capacities
characterizing knowing-how. In Section 7 of our
paper (Bartels &  May this collection, pp. 16–
17)  we  have  provided  different  empirical  ex-
amples  of  mainly  psychological  research  that
has already been undertaken in this line. 
We are looking at the subject not so much
from the perspective of  philosophers  of  mind,
but from the perspectives of philosophy of sci-
ence and psychology. We therefore do not see
good reasons to go into any detail of the specific
theory  that  Ramiro Glauer explores  in  the
second part of his commentary (this collection,
pp. 6–7), namely the measurement view of pro-
positional attitudes (Matthews 2007). Since our
contribution does not intend to propose a new
theory of knowing-how, it would be quite point-
less to compare the potential merits of such a
theoretical  view with our own account.  What
we  suggest  is  that  psychological  research,  or
cognitive scientific research more generally, may
work along the path we have outlined, and thus
make progress in explaining knowing-how.
2 Conclusion
We agree  to  the  commentary  concerning  our
main  arguments  against  both,  intellectualist
and  anti-intellectualist  accounts  of  knowing-
how.  But  we  disagree  with  it  concerning  the
picture that it draws of the aim of our account.
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